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Abstract 
The National Football League’s salary cap constrains the available resources each 
franchise is allotted to spend on player personnel. I examine the effects of executive 
management’s compensation allocation strategies on team performance from 2006 to 
2013. The findings suggest that spending more than the league-average on offensive 
lineman hurts overall team performance. Spending above the league average on both the 
offensive line and quarterback positions negatively affects offensive performance as well. 
This supports previous research stating that taking a superstar-approach to cap 
distribution negatively affects team performance. Furthermore, I find evidence of 
increased compensation inequality among players under the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement of 2011 compared to that of 1993. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
In 1993, the National Football League (“NFL”) and its players’ association agreed 
on a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that created a salary cap, or limit, on the 
amount of money each franchise is allowed to spend on its players in a particular season. 
In exchange for team salary caps, the players received the right to gain free agency for 
the first time. Free agency allows players to switch teams upon the expiration of their 
contract with their current team. The creation of free agency created a new dynamic in 
the sport as it opened the door for franchises to sign players who were previously 
unavailable to them.  
The combination of both free agency and the NFL salary cap created the need for 
franchises to allocate their available resources as efficiently as possible. Teams needed to 
find an optimal relationship between player compensation and team performance. This 
relationship between compensation and performance is common throughout economics 
and finance research. The study of allocating available resources to maximize 
performance has been studied at length and is discussed in the literature review in the 
ensuing section. The purpose of this study is to determine the potential effect of player 
compensation allocation on team performance. The measure of team performance that I 
use primarily consists of each team’s number of regular season wins over the duration of 
the study (2006-2013).  
 The paper proceeds in the following order. To conclude Section I, I provide a 
brief history on the NFL salary cap and a literature review of previous studies on related 
topics. In Section II, a model is supplied to examine the relationship between player 
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compensation and team performance, while Section III, outlines the data and variables 
used in the study. I report the results of the study in Section IV and offer possible 
explanations for the results produced. Finally, a summary and conclusion are provided in 
Section V. This section includes a discussion on further work needed to advance this 
preliminary study.  
  
History of the NFL Salary Cap 
 
 The NFL instituted a hard salary cap for the 1994 season in accordance with the 
1993 CBA between the NFL and the National Football League Players’ Association 
(NFLPA). The introduction of the salary cap was designed to create greater parity among 
NFL teams and is often credited for the league’s enormous popularity. Under the 1993 
CBA, the NFL set the salary cap for each new league year based on a percentage of their 
Defined Gross Revenues. In 2006, the formulation was changed to include a percentage 
of the NFL’s total salary, which added other revenue streams such as local advertising. 
 The hard salary cap forbids teams from exceeding the league’s salary cap ceiling 
for that specific year.1 A team’s salary cap is the sum of each player’s “cap value” on 
their 53-man roster. Player contracts consist of a base salary and various bonuses which 
can be earned over the life of the contract. A player’s base salary is not guaranteed, 
meaning they can be released at any time during the contract and the team no longer has 
the obligation to pay them their base salary. Bonuses, on the other hand, are paid as lump 
sums at the date in which they are earned and generally cannot be recovered. The 
different type of bonuses include signing bonuses (paid at beginning of contract), training 
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camp bonuses (paid at beginning of training camp), roster bonuses (paid upon making the 
53-man roster), and an assortment of incentive bonuses. These incentive bonuses are 
distinguished between “likely to be earned” bonuses (LBTEs) and “not likely to be 
earned” bonuses (NLBTEs). A player’s cap value is calculated as: 
  
Cap Value = Base salary + (total contract signing bonus/number of seasons of 
contract duration) + training camp bonus + roster bonus + LTBEs  (1) 
 
As mentioned previously, the sum of each players cap value on the 53-man roster 
cannot exceed the league’s salary cap. Table 2 shows the league wide salary cap for the 
years 2006-2013, the focus of this research. In 2008, the NFL owners opted out of the 
1993 CBA which led to an uncapped year in 2010. The NFL cautioned the 32 teams not 
to take advantage of the uncapped year by front-loading contracts in order to have a 
reduced cap hit in future capped seasons. Most teams listened and treated the 2010 season 
as if there was a cap in place even though nothing was ever put into writing. However, 
the Dallas Cowboys and Washington Redskins did not adhere to the advice and severely 
front-loaded their contracts during this 2010 season. The NFL retaliated by stripping the 
Cowboys of $10 million of cap space and the Redskins of $36 million of cap space over 
the 2011 and 2012 seasons. Although neither team technically violated the salary cap, the 
penalty remained after appeals from both the franchises. I will include the 2010 season in 
my regressions for this study due to 30 of the 32 teams treating the season as if there was 
a salary cap in place. However, an altercation may be needed to normalize the effects of 
the Cowboys and Redskins generous spending.  
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The NFL and NFLPA agreed to a new CBA in 2011 which reinstated the salary 
cap starting in the 2011 season. The 2011 CBA created a $120 million salary cap for the 
2011 season and introduced a salary floor that would not be enforced until the 2013 
season. The cap floor required each team to spend at least 88.8% of the salary cap in 
2013 and 90% thereafter. The salary floor is intended to deter teams from significantly 
reducing player contracts in an effort to minimize costs. The cap floor is based on total 
cash spent over two separate four year periods allowing teams to spend less than the floor 
in certain seasons without violating the CBA.  
 
Literature Review 
 
In 1994, the NFL instituted a salary cap that limits the amount of money a given 
team can spend on its roster. The introduction of this hard salary cap resulted from the 
new collective bargaining agreement in an effort to create parity across the different 
franchises. Larsen, Fenn, and Spenner (2006) confirm the implementation of the salary 
cap in the NFL did increase competitive balance by spreading the wealth of talent around 
the league. They found that teams’ cap spending from 2000-2002 was negatively 
correlated with their spending from 2004-2005. This implies that the salary cap is 
effective in reducing teams from constantly spending more than other teams year after 
year. With a salary cap and increased parity in the NFL, it is important for teams to 
strategically allocate resources across players and positions to maximize wins and 
increase return to owners.  
5 
 
 Kowalewski and Leeds (1999) focus on the distribution and structure of salaries 
in the NFL from 1992-1994, before and after the implementation of the salary cap. By 
using Gini coefficients, Kowalewski and Leeds conclude that the salary cap created a less 
equal distribution of salaries in the NFL. The Gini coefficient, which measures statistical 
dispersion of income distribution, rose from 0.393 in 1992 to 0.479 in 1993. The rise in 
the Gini coefficient shows a significant increase in the inequality of contracts in the NFL. 
Furthermore, Kowalewski and Leeds found that “superstars” received higher pay after the 
salary cap in 1994 in relation to the pre- salary cap era in 1992. The increase in salary for 
superstars seemed to come at expense of the marginal players in the NFL. Players in the 
60th percentile in salary distribution earned less money under the new salary cap rules, 
whereas the players at around the 65th percentile earned higher salaries post salary cap. 
The increase in salary inequality started to push the “NFL toward a two-class system with 
a small group of very wealthy players and a much larger group of (relatively) poor 
players” (p.219). The effect of the inequality of pay between the superstars and everyone 
else is discussed below on when analyzing team success in relation to resource allocation.  
 In a later study, Kowalewski and Leeds (2001) dive deeper and look at the effect 
of the salary cap on the compensation of offensive skill players in the NFL. Offensive 
skill players consist of the players who regularly touch the football such as quarterbacks, 
running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends. The authors employ a quantile regression 
for players at the 25th and 75th quantiles of income distribution2. This regression allows 
them to compare and contrast players that are highly-paid with players that receive lower 
levels of income. The results showed that all offensive skill players’ mean salaries rose, 
but only quarterbacks’ median salary increased as well. This illustrates that the salaries of 
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running backs, wide receivers, and tight ends became skewed to the right after the 
introduction of the salary cap. Unlike their previous study, Kowalewski and Leeds 
indicate that it is easier for players in the .25 quantile to increase their wages, while it was 
less common for those players that were already compensated well in the .75 quantile. 
Intuitively, this makes sense as “a player’s bargaining power from having a good year is 
greater when he is relatively underpaid than when he is relatively highly paid” (p.256). 
 An important factor to consider in the Kowalewski and Leeds findings revolves 
around non-guaranteed contracts in the NFL. Franchises can release a player who is not 
performing well and not be stuck with his base salary for future years. Teams frequently 
sign players to large contracts and release them before the end of the agreement. This can 
partially account for why it is less common for players who are already highly paid to 
achieve further economic gain. Thus, guaranteed money, often signing bonuses, are a 
better indicator of the economic commitment a franchise makes to its players. Signing 
bonuses are usually collected in the early years of a contract and must be paid even if the 
player is released. Finally, Kowalewski and Leeds observe compensation post-salary cap 
is more reliant on performance. This differs with the pre-salary cap era where players 
were compensated mainly for which position they played.   
 Rosen (1981) points out in particular labor markets, even small differences in 
talent can cause enormous differences in income distribution. This seems to be the case 
with player contracts in the NFL. Rosen labels this the “superstar effect” where “the 
income distribution is stretched out in its right-hand tail compared to the distribution of 
talent” (p.846). This “superstar effect” can help explain the two-class system that 
Kowalewski and Leeds (1999) found in NFL wages.  
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 Quinn, Geier, and Berkovitz (2007) delve further into the allocation of teams’ 
salary cap by analyzing every NFL franchise’s budget from 2000-2005. Their findings 
are consistent with Rosen’s “superstar” income distribution and are supported by a 
“marginal win utility product” model rather than the standard marginal revenue product 
model. This seems accurate because there is not a significant drop off in talent when 
comparing the highest paid players down to the lowest paid players. Thus, the “superstar” 
income distribution makes sense because small differences in talent results in large pay 
inequality due to the large impact on wins of even small difference of talent. In addition, 
the authors investigate salary cap distribution among players and on-field results. They 
found that teams with a higher than average winning percentage allocated more of their 
money on players ranked 15th through 30th in relation to cap spending, and less on players 
ranked 35th to 53rd. However, the researches failed to obtain a statistically significant 
correlation between income distribution and winning percentage. They suggest a 
relationship may in fact exist between the two variables, but they cannot reach a 
statistically significant conclusion from their data set.  
 Borghesi (2008) analyzed the 1994-2004 NFL seasons in an attempt to develop a 
relationship between wage distribution and team performance. Borghesi cites Lazear’s 
work (1989, 1991) that supports firm efficiency when pay among employees is 
distributed relatively evenly. With this in mind, Borghesi set out to discover how to best 
allocate compensation amongst a team’s roster. Teams may choose to employ a superstar 
approach or a more egalitarian method to filling out their roster under the constraints of 
the salary cap. In his statistical analysis, the author regressed a player’s base and bonus 
pay separately because of the important differences between them. As mentioned 
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previously, signing bonuses are usually collected in the early years of a contract whereas 
a player’s base salary can be voided if the team releases the player. Results from 
Borghesi’s regression revealed teams that spend more than the league average on bonuses 
to any defensive position are likely to perform better on defense than those teams that do 
not. Moreover, the findings point to a significant, positive relationship between 
performance and base pay for running backs and quarterbacks. Performance bonuses are 
incentive based and are collected when a player reaches a predetermined benchmark, 
such as 500 rushing yards in a season. In contrast to base salary, “superstar” approaches 
to the offensive side of the ball concerning bonus pay tended to backfire as those offenses 
performed fairly poorly. Furthermore, when Borghesi’s regression included a team’s win-
loss record he found a significant relationship between overall team performance and 
positional spending for quarterbacks, tight ends, and the defensive line. The author 
concludes by stressing “teams that compensate players the most inequitably are those 
most likely to perform the worst” (p.15) due to a negative estimate for the bonus Gini 
coefficient. Borghesi suggests this is because of the presence of a highly-paid superstar 
increases the dissatisfaction of lower-paid teammates to the point of disruption.  
 The literature to date has emphasized the increase in salary inequality in the NFL 
since the introduction of the hard salary cap in 1994. It also touches on the relationship 
between the distribution of wages and a team’s on-field performance. The aim of this 
study is to analyze the relationship between resource allocation distribution and team 
performance in an attempt to understand the components of an optimal wage distribution 
strategy. As with any industry, the NFL is constantly evolving and new strategies are 
likely to have been implemented to help gain a competitive advantage. In particular, I use 
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Gini coefficients to gain further insight on the strategies NFL general managers are 
employing to maximize the effectiveness of their limited resources. In the models 
developed below, I predict teams with an above-average win-loss record spend more 
money on “critical” positions, such as quarterback and defensive line, than teams with an 
average or below-average win-loss record. I also expect to see a more inequitable pay 
structure at these critical positions because of the high perceived value at these positions.  
 
II. The Model  
 
This study is conducted assuming that owners and general managers are driven to 
construct the best team they possibly can in relation to team performance. Thus, the 
objective function of executive management in this study is measured mainly by the 
number of regular season wins per year and secondarily by unit performance. This study 
assumes that teams will make resource allocation decisions with the goal of maximizing 
the number of wins in a season. I assume this because it seems contradictory to believe 
general managers would focus on anything other than team performance with their jobs 
on the line. However, perhaps not all owners are as committed to team success as others. 
Some owners may value maximizing profits more than maximizing wins. This can lead to 
teams spending a lot of money on a popular player that is more likely to enhance fan 
attendance and merchandise sales. This rationale behind the allocation of cap space 
among players would lead to alternative predictions. Therefore, finding results opposite 
the prediction of this study may be consistent with profit maximization rather than win 
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maximization. However, I am not able to directly support this alternative conclusion due 
to lack of information on team profits.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of management’s compensation 
allocation decisions on team performance. The goal of NFL general managers, like 
management of any firm, is to find effective strategies to maximize performance under 
resource constraints. In the NFL, general managers must find a way to best utilize its 
team’s cap space under the constraints of the collective bargaining agreement. Some 
franchises may employ a strategy of superstar pay where they pay premium prices on top 
athletes and fill in the rest of the roster with relatively lower-paid players. Other teams 
may choose to spread out their cap space and utilize a more egalitarian approach in player 
compensation. This would allow a franchise to sign and retain more middle-tier talent 
than teams that exhaust a majority of their cap space on a small number of players.  
 Strategies for compensation structures may have changed over the duration of this 
study due to the different cap constraints and CBA’s in place at the time. Teams could 
have adjusted their allocation strategies with each of the three different set of rules (1993 
CBA, 2010 uncapped year, and 2011 CBA). For example, teams could have used the lack 
of salary floor in 2011 and 2012 to go well below the salary cap in order to carry over 
unused cap space in future years. This will be monitored with the comparison of Gini 
coefficients for total team spending and positional spending throughout the league during 
the researched period.  
 Gini coefficients are used to measure income inequality and statistical dispersion 
among individuals in a group setting. This study uses Gini coefficients to compare team 
and positional compensation variances relative to the NFL average. A coefficient of 0 
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represents perfect competition and a coefficient of 1 represents utmost inequality among 
values.3 Thus, a low Gini signifies an egalitarian pay approach with a high Gini 
representing more of a superstar approach.  
 Other variables used in this study comprise positional, unit, and team 
compensation numbers and ratios. These variables include the percentage of the NFL 
salary cap a team spends, the percentage of cap a franchise spends on its quarterback 
compared to the rest of the offense, and the percentage of compensation given to the 
defensive line in comparison with the rest of the team. The reasoning behind picking 
these variables is discussed in the next section. These variables allow me to explore any 
relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variables being 
examined such as a franchise’s total number of wins per season. These variables 
describing the construction of each franchise will hopefully give us more insight on the 
roster construction of a football team and its relation to team performance. Different 
general managers value each position differently and thus spend more resources on 
certain positions than others. The purpose is to determine which pay strategies produce 
the best outcomes.  
 The OLS regression model that I use to quantify the relationship between team 
performance and player compensation is defined as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡, (2) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is team i’s performance (either number of wins in the regular season, offensive 
points scored per game ranking, or defensive points allowed per game ranking) in season 
t.  
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 When 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is measuring the number of team wins a season, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a vector that 
includes the positional compensation terms 𝑄𝐵𝑖𝑡,𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡, and 𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡.  𝑄𝐵𝑖𝑡,𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡 ,  𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 
contain the compensation figures for the quarterback, defensive line, and offensive line 
positions respectively for team i in year t. The independent variable 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a vector 
that includes the unit compensation terms 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡. 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 are 
comprised of the total amount of cap spent on offensive and defensive players 
respectively for team i in year t.  
 When 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is measuring offensive unit performance, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a vector that includes 
the positional compensation terms  𝑄𝐵𝑖𝑡 and 𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡. The independent variable 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector that includes the unit compensation term 𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡. 
 When 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is measuring defensive unit performance, 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a vector that includes 
the positional compensation term 𝐷𝐿𝑖𝑡. The independent variable 𝑈𝑁𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 is a vector that 
includes the unit compensation term 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡.  
 For all measures of performance, 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 includes the total amount of cap spent by 
each team i in year t. 𝐺𝑀𝑖𝑡 contains any general manager retention for team i in year t. 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 is comprised of ownership retention for team i in year t.  
 Among all of the independent variables, I predict that an increase in compensation 
for quarterbacks and defensive linemen will be positively correlated with increased team 
performance. These two positions are often of high value to franchise management and 
because of this I expect them to have a significant effect on team success.  
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Selection of Variables  
 
Teams must determine which positions they think are most important for 
maximizing wins and how to correctly allocate their cap space amongst the different 
positions. This study will focus mainly on the compensation and performance of three 
positions generally thought to be of significant importance to a team’s success. These 
positions include quarterback, offensive line, and defensive line.  
These three positions were selected over others for a variety of reasons. First, 
Borghesi (2008) found a significant relationship team between performance and the 
compensation of quarterbacks and members of the defensive line. Specifically, there was 
a link between the number of wins a team accrued during the season and the amount of 
compensation allocated to these positions. Next, there has been a recent trend to select 
these positions at a higher frequency in the early stages of the first round of the NFL’s 
first-year player draft.4 First round draft picks are considered to be one of a team’s most 
valuable resources because of the ability to select and retain an elite player to build a 
team around. Therefore, general managers use first round draft picks on positions they 
think are most important to the success of their team. Examining the frequency of players 
selected at a specific position is thus a good approach of observing the value management 
places on certain positions compared to others. In the 2013 NFL Draft, the selection of 
players playing either offensive or defensive line was staggering. The top-six picks of the 
draft consisted of three offensive lineman and three defensive linemen. In addition, the 
top-14 picks of the draft included five offensive linemen and six defensive linemen. The 
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recent trend of valuing these positions above others factored significantly in including 
offensive and defensive linemen in this study.    
 Finally, these positions account for 18 of the top 25 highest-paid players in the 
NFL.5 Quarterbacks rank first with nine of the highest-paid players, defensive line ranks 
second with five players in the top-25, and offensive line is tied for third with four 
players. The large amounts of money teams are willing to spend on these positions 
illustrate just how much they value these positions.  
 Additionally, I will control for managerial stability, such as ownership and 
general manager retention. New personnel in key executive positions are likely to have an 
effect on compensation strategy. 
 
III. Data  
 
      I have compiled a data set of 256 team-year observations for the 2006-2013 
NFL seasons. The data set includes positional compensation data, productivity statistics, 
and executive management retention for each of the eight seasons studied. The 
compensation data consists of the “cap hit” for each team’s position groups and offensive 
and defensive units. Productivity statistics consist of a team’s regular season win-loss 
record and their points per game (PPG) ranking for both points allowed and points 
scored. Executive management trends contain both general manager and ownership 
stability. Player compensation data were obtained from USA Today, NFL Players’ 
Association (NFLPA.org), Over the Cap (overthecap.com), and ianwhetstone.com. 
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Productivity stats were obtained from the National Football League (NFL.com) and 
executive trends from Pro-Football-Reference.  
 The data for the productivity and executive trends statistics are likely to be 
accurate because they can be confirmed through multiple outlets. The compensation data 
are less reliable as it is difficult to track exact compensation figures for NFL teams 
because they are not readily available for the public. Compiling data from different 
sources can be a cause for concern, but the sources they are collected from are reliable. 
After cross checking compensations figures among the different sources I believe any 
errors in the data and variables would be immaterial.  
 Summary statistics are located in Table 3 and a correlation table among key 
variables is located in Table 4.  
  
IV. Results 
 
Team Performance  
  
Table 5 shows the positive correlation associated with the number of wins in a 
season and the percentage of salary cap a team spends in a given season. The regression 
coefficient illustrates that a 10% increase in salary cap spent is associated with just over 
one additional win per season. The low R2  signifies an overall lack of predictive power of 
the equation, but it is not surprising given the cross-sectional nature of the data. However, 
the P value of .002 displays a significant relationship between the overall cap spending 
and the number of wins earned in the regular season. The correlation between the two 
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variables might help show the advantage of spending close to, if not more, than the entire 
salary cap in any given season. Teams that believe they will be poor in the upcoming 
season may then be inclined to spend as little as possible in order to carry over unused 
cap space to future years. This unused cap space would allow them to spend more in 
future years and thus possibly increase their chance of winning more games in upcoming 
seasons.  
 Total cap space spent on offensive linemen and number of wins per season was 
found to be negatively correlated at the 95% confidence level. An additional $1,000,000 
in cap space spent on the offensive line position is correlated with a reduction of about 
half a game won per season. This negatively correlated relationship is a bit surprising at 
first glance, but may be feasibly explained by several possible reasons. Teams usually 
carry around eight to nine offensive linemen on their 53-man roster, a number that is 
normally greater than every other position on the team besides the defensive line. If a 
team spends a large amount of money on their offensive line, they will be sacrificing vital 
resources available to invest in the rest of the team. Additionally, successful offensive 
lines are generally associated with having strong chemistry. A team with five linemen 
who work well together may be more effective than an offensive line with high-priced 
players that don’t cooperate as well. Hence, general managers may be better off focusing 
on acquiring offensive linemen through the draft where their rookie contract 
compensation will be significantly lower than acquiring offensive linemen through free 
agency. Offensive linemen acquired through free agency may also not perform as well 
with their new team because they are not familiar with the offensive linemen already 
present. These results can also be seen in Table 5.  
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Unit Performance 
 
 Table 6 shows the correlation between total cap spent on quarterbacks and that 
team’s offensive points scored per game ranking. It is important to note that a ranking of 
one means that team’s offense scored the most points per game out of any team in the 
NFL. Thus, a team with a lower number in this ranking system performed better 
offensively than a team with a higher number. There is a positive correlation between the 
total amount spent on the quarterback position and a team’s offensive points per game 
ranking. As just discussed, this means that the more a team spends on a quarterback the 
worse they perform on offense. Specifically, an additional $1,000,000 spent on the 
quarterback position is associated with a team’s offense dropping a little less than two 
spots in the NFL’s offensive points scored per game ranking. The importance of having a 
good quarterback can pressure a team into overspending on the position leading to an 
imbalance between compensation and performance. Franchises are more willing to spend 
money on quarterbacks and as a result are more prone to significantly overpaying these 
players.6 This imbalance in compensation to performance can adversely impact a 
franchise’s win-loss record. Borghesi (2008) finds similar results as he notes the negative 
correlation between unexplained starter pay and offensive performance.  
 A similar reduction in offensive performance is found with an increase in 
spending on offensive linemen as shown in Table 6. Every additional $1,000,000 spent 
on offensive linemen is associated with a team dropping about two and a half spots in 
offensive points scored per game rankings. Performing well in any team sport requires 
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contribution from all team members. These findings so far support previous research in 
the area that advise against superstar spending and support a spread-the-wealth type of 
approach. Additionally, it is important to note that offensive line compensation and 
performance of both the overall team and the offensive unit has been negatively 
correlated. While these results are far from conclusive, it is interesting to point out that 
this has been the only position group researched that has two negative relationships with 
team performance.  
 I did not find a significant relationship between defensive line compensation and 
the performance of that defensive unit as whole as seen in Table 7. A possible reason 
could be the lack of other data points on the defensive side of the ball. Regarding the 
offense, I researched the compensation of six of the starting eleven players. This allowed 
for the study of a majority of the offense and possibly is the reason why I found potential 
relationships between performance and the compensation of quarterbacks and offensive 
linemen. Most defenses start either three or four defensive linemen which accounts for 
only a minority of the defense.7 Increased data points from the other defensive positions 
may help illustrate a relationship between the compensation of defensive linemen and 
team or unit performance. Conversely, it may be the case that linebacker or defensive 
back positions serve as a better determinant of compensation and performance.  
 
Differing Cap Constraints 
 
 I computed inter-team Gini coefficients for each franchise’s total cap spent, along 
with the Gini coefficients for the three positions of interest around the league over the 
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duration of the study. Relatively low Gini coefficients are expected because of the similar 
cap constraints placed on each franchise due to all teams having to adhere to the CBA. 
However, we can still track the effect of the three differing sets of rules (1993 CBA, 
uncapped 2010 season, and 2011 CBA) on the distribution of player compensation. Did 
one set of cap constraints promote higher inequality of pay among players? 
 The Gini coefficients do point to a difference in the distribution of compensation 
among players depending on the rules in place at a certain time. By looking at the Gini 
coefficients in Table 8 we can see that there is more of a discrepancy in overall team 
salary under the 2011 CBA than under the 1993 CBA. Intuitively, the uncapped 2010 
year will stimulate higher income inequality because franchises were not bound to the 
same set of rules. As mentioned previously, the Dallas Cowboys and Washington 
Redskins spent significantly more money than the other teams in the league that year 
which help push the Gini coefficient upwards. The Gini coefficients are likely boosted 
because the additional spending of these two teams were concentrated on a few players.8 
However, the Gini coefficients for overall team spending from 2011-2013 (adhering to 
the 2011 CBA) are still considerably higher than the 2006-2009 seasons that were subject 
to the 1993 CBA. The mean Gini coefficient for the 2006-2009 seasons is 0.016 
compared to 0.034 for the 2011-2013 seasons. Figure 1 helps visualize the results in a bar 
graph.  
  Table 9 shows the results of a two-sample t-test comparing the mean Ginis for 
NFL teams both under the 1993 CBA and under the 2011 CBA. The p-value of 0.0319 in 
the Pr(|T| > |t|) row shows a significant difference between the means of the two 
variables. However, the very small sample size must be taken into account.  
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 A similar trend can be found when examining the Gini coefficients for positional 
spending among teams over the duration of the study. Table 10 highlights the Gini 
coefficients for each position over the time period studied. The seasons played under the 
2011 CBA result in a higher mean Gini coefficient for each position in comparison to the 
seasons played under the 1993 CBA. The mean Gini for the quarterback position under 
the old CBA is 0.206 in comparison to 0.260 under the new CBA. The mean Gini 
increased from 0.152 to 0.203 among defensive linemen and increased from 0.122 to 
0.163 among offensive linemen. The offensive line is the only position group whose 
mean Gini may regress back to 1993 levels as indicated by its 0.122 Gini coefficient in 
2013. The mean Ginis both before and after the 2011 CBA for each position is shown in 
Figure 2. 
 Tables 11-13 display the t-tests comparing the mean Ginis for each position 
studied under the two different salary caps. Both the mean Ginis for the quarterback and 
defensive line positions are significantly different for the differing cap constraints at the 
95% level. The defensive line p-value shows significance at the 99% level. Conversely, 
the mean Ginis for the two different salary cap era for the offensive line position are only 
significantly different at the 90%. Once again, sample size here is extremely small and 
must be taken into consideration.  
Gini coefficients are significantly highest amongst the quarterback position. This 
should not be surprising because, as discussed earlier, they tend to be the highest-paid 
position. The high value placed on the position will cause general managers to spend a 
great deal and sometimes overpay for marginal talent. When mixing some of the highest-
paid players in the NFL with rookies (and other lower-paid quarterbacks) it is easier to 
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comprehend a possible reason as to why the quarterback position has greater income 
inequality.  
 Potential reasons for the 2011 CBA producing higher Gini coefficients in 
comparison to the old CBA may stem from rule changes enacted in the current CBA. 
First, the lack of a salary cap floor for the 2011 and 2012 seasons may be associated with 
a greater inequality in team spending under the current CBA. Teams more concerned 
with turning a profit, instead of producing wins, could have planned to spend less during 
these years to keep costs down. The difference in spending between these franchises and 
franchises that spent near the salary cap limit may have produced the higher Gini 
coefficients related with the 2011 CBA.  
Second, a new rule allowing franchises to carry over unused salary cap to future 
years may also be part of the explanation. Teams that foresee themselves being poor in 
the upcoming season may spend less in the current year in order spend more in future 
years by carrying over their unused cap space. This too creates an increase in team 
spending inequality as team spending deviates further from the mean in both directions. 
This carry over strategy is similar to the big bath strategy used by upper management in 
financial reporting.9 
 Additionally, a rule change significantly reducing rookie contract compensation 
may have something to do with the increased income inequality. Under the 1993 CBA, 
rookie contracts were skyrocketing to the point where the unproven rookies drafted in the 
first round were getting paid significantly more than established NFL veterans.10 The 
reduction in rookie compensation freed up more money for each franchise and allowed 
general managers to spend more in free agency. This increase in resources may have very 
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well driven up the prices on free agents because most teams could now afford to spend a 
significant amount on free agents. This situation would once again create a greater 
disparity in compensation amongst NFL players.  
 The possible explanations for an increase in income inequality I provided are only 
a guess to what I believe may have happened. I leave it up to future researchers to further 
dive into this topic and explain the reasoning behind the results I have gathered.  
  
V. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The implementation of the NFL salary cap in 1994 forced NFL teams to make 
tough resource allocation decisions during the construction of their roster. This study 
attempts to understand the effects of different compensation strategies on team 
performance. We find that overspending on the offensive line position is negatively 
correlated with team and unit performance. In addition, we found that paying more than 
league average on the quarterback position is negatively associated with offensive 
performance. These findings contest my hypotheses stating that spending more on key 
positions would benefit team performance.   
 Although this study only focused on three position groups, we found no evidence 
linking increased team performance with over-compensating players. This lack of 
evidence coincides with previous research suggesting that overpaying players does not 
lead to better team performance (Borghesi, 2008).  
 Thus, it is interesting to learn of an increase in player income inequality since the 
application of the 2011 CBA. The new rules of the 2011 CBA likely play a part in the 
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increased salary inequality amongst players. This begs the question of whether the NFL 
Players’ Association actually endorsed the idea of greater income inequality among its 
players by reducing rookie contract compensation. The reduction in rookie salaries 
allowed franchises the opportunity to spend more money to acquire veteran players.  
However, the small sample size observed in this study leaves it up to future 
researchers to further study the impact of the 2011 CBA on player compensation equality. 
Additionally, this study did not find any compensation allocation strategies that were 
positively associated with increased team performance. I surely missed out on key 
independent variables, such as the remaining position groups, which future researchers 
may include in their own studies to produce more significant results.   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
 
Definition of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
QB Total salary cap spent on the quarterback position for a given team 
DL Total salary cap spent on the defensive line position for a given team 
OL Total salary cap spent on the offensive line position for a given team 
QB% Salary cap spent on the quarterback position divided by total salary cap spent for a given team 
DL% Salary cap spent on the defensive line position divided by total salary cap spent for a given team 
OL% Salary cap spent on the offensive line position divided by total salary cap spent for a given team 
QB/OFF Salary cap spent on the quarterback position divided by total salary cap spent on all offensive players for a given team 
DL/DEF Salary cap spent on the defensive line position divided by total salary cap spent on all offensive players for a given team 
OL/OFF Salary cap spent on the offensive line position divided by total salary cap spent on all offensive players of a given team 
OFF Total salary cap spent on all offensive players of a given team 
DEF Total salary cap spent on all defensive players of a given team 
OFF% Total salary cap spent on all offensive players divided by total salary cap spent on all players of a given team 
DEF% Total salary cap spent on all defensive players divided by total salary cap spent on all players of a given team 
CAP Total salary cap spent on all players of a given team 
CAP% Total salary cap spent on all players of a given team divided by the NFL’s salary cap ceiling 
GMNEW A dummy variable equal to one if there was a new general manager for a team in the current year, and zero otherwise 
GMFRD A dummy variable equal to one if the general manager of a team was fired in the current year, and zero otherwise  
OWN A dummy variable equal to one if there was a change in ownership in the given year, and zero otherwise 
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Table 2 
 
NFL Salary Cap by Year 
 
Year Salary Cap 
2006 $102 million 
2007 $109 million 
2008 $116 million 
2009 $123 million 
2010 Uncapped* 
2011 $120.6 million 
2012 $123 million 
2013 $133 million 
 
 
* No salary cap during the 2010 season  
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Table 3 
 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables  
 
The data compiled is from the 2006-2013 NFL seasons. QB, DL, OL, OFF, DEF, and CAP are all 
represented in millions ($).  
 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
QB 256 11.16 10.77 4.99 2.13 26.74 
DL 256 20.48 20.14 6.67 7.24 38.44 
OL 256 20.62 20.47 5.52 7.26 35.00 
OFF 256 58.27 57.57 8.96 35.17 100.15 
DEF 256 55.05 54.52 9.12 33.71 88.20 
CAP 256 116.83 116.23 12.36 90.11 178.24 
QB% 256 9.4% 9.1% 3.9% 1.9% 20.4% 
QB/OFF 256 18.9% 18.2% 7.4% 4.7% 44.6% 
DL% 256 17.5% 17.4% 5.3% 5.3% 30.1% 
DL/DEF 256 37.4% 37.4% 11.1% 10.0% 64.8% 
OL% 256 17.7% 17.6% 4.5% 6.4% 32.5% 
OL/OFF 256 35.4% 34.9% 8.0% 15.6% 60.0% 
OFF% 256 49.9% 50.2% 5.7% 35.7% 63.9% 
DEF% 256 47.1% 47.0% 5.9% 31.9% 61.2% 
CAP% 256 99.2% 99.7% 5.4% 76.2% 118.3% 
Gini Team 8 .0309 .0247 .0226 .0119 .0813 
Gini QB 8 .2302 .2256 .0328 .1899 .2969 
Gini DL 8 .1736 .1725 .0280 .1341 .2165 
Gini OL 8 .1434 .1251    .0306 .1137 .1893 
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Table 4 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 
There are 256 team-year observations from the 32 franchises spanning the 2006-2013 NFL seasons. 
 
 Wins OPPG DPPG QB DL OL OFF DEF CAP CAP% GMNEW OWN 
Wins 1            
OPPG -0.77 1           
DPPG -0.66 0.31 1          
QB 0.77 -0.03 0.13 1         
DL 0.76 -0.18 0.61 0.14 1        
OL 0.04 -0.07 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 1       
OFF 0.59 0.22 0.11 0.46 0.06 0.51 1      
DEF 0.26 -0.34 0.31 0.09 0.34 -0.23 -0.26 1     
CAP 0.29 0.79 0.20 0.34 0.32 0.24 0.60 0.59 1    
CAP% 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.49 0.38 0.71 1   
GMNEW 0.26 0.00 0.20 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.09 1  
OWN 0.08 0.45 0.40 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.16 0.16 0.18 -0.02 1 
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Table 5 
 
Determinants of Team Wins 
 
This table contains results from an OLS regression clustered by each individual NFL franchise. The 
dependent variable is number of wins a team earns in the regular season. There are 256 team-year 
observations from the 32 franchises spanning the 2006-2013 NFL seasons. The coefficient estimates are 
listed with associated p-values. *, **, and *** note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
 
R2 = 0.20 
                    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable, number of wins in the regular season, is significantly correlated with both the total 
cap space spent on offensive linemen and the percentage of the NFL salary cap a team spends in a season.  
Variable Coefficient P-Value 
QB -0.08612 0.771 
DL -0.0688 0.761 
OL -0.6384** 0.037 
QB/OFF 7.7972 0.646 
DL/DEF 0.1286 0.993 
OL/OFF 34.2022 0.102 
OFF -0.3590 0.585 
OFF% 75.8071 0.255 
DEF -0.9091 0.260 
DEF% 114.9002 0.174 
CAP 0.7410 0.289 
CAP% 12.3023*** 0.002 
GMNEW -0.6453 0.262 
GMFRD -2.5767 0.000 
OWN -1.8362 0.080 
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Table 6 
 
Determinants of Unit Performance 
-Offensive Unit Performance 
 
This table contains results from an OLS regression clustered by each individual NFL franchise. The 
dependent variable is offensive points per game scored ranking. There are 256 team-year observations from 
the 32 franchises spanning the 2006-2013 NFL seasons. A negative coefficient shows an increase in 
performance due to the ranking of 1 being the best and the ranking of 32 being the worst. Coefficient 
estimates are listed with associated p-values. *, **, and *** note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 
 
R2 = 0.15 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 
QB 
 
1.8640** 
 
0.030 
 
QB% 
 
-279.6485 
 
0.112 
 
QB/OFF 
 
14.7820 
 
0.817 
 
OL 
 
2.3088* 
 
0.070 
 
OL% 
 
-263.2913 
 
0.145 
 
OL/OFF 
 
6.9543 
 
0.890 
 
OFF 
 
-1.2273 
 
0.216 
 
OFF% 
 
135.0914 
 
0.345 
 
CAP 
 
-0.1044 
 
0.791 
 
CAP% -38.5574 0.124 
GMNEW 56.3532 0.000 
GMFRD 7.5456 0.000 
OWN 2.2042 0.450 
 
The dependent variable, offensive points per game scored rank, is significantly correlated with the total cap 
space spent on quarterbacks and the total cap space spent on offensive linemen.  
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Table 7 
 
Determinants of Unit Performance 
-Defensive Unit Performance 
 
This table contains results from an OLS regression clustered by each individual NFL franchise. The 
dependent variable is defensive points per game allowed ranking. There are 256 team-year observations 
from the 32 franchises spanning the 2006-2013 NFL seasons. A negative coefficient shows an increase in 
performance due to the ranking of 1 being the best and the ranking of 32 being the worst. Coefficient 
estimates are listed with associated p-values. *, **, and *** note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels. 
 
 
R2 = 0.12 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
P-Value 
 
DL 
 
0.4784 
 
0.606 
 
DL% 
 
15.8281 
 
0.905 
DL/DEF -27.1620 0.489 
 
DEF 
 
0.9396 
 
0.305 
 
DEF% 
 
-158.9495 
 
0.170 
 
CAP 
 
-0.5239 
 
0.197 
 
CAP% 
 
-22.84771 
 
0.115 
 
GMNEW 
 
1.9385 
 
0.201 
 
GMFRD 
 
6.0873 
 
0.000 
 
OWN 
 
2.6905 
 
0.399 
 
There are no significant relationships between the dependent variable, defensive points allowed per game 
rank, and any of the independent variables.   
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Table 8 
 
Gini Coefficients of Total Salary Cap Spent Amongst NFL Teams 
 
The 2006-2009 seasons fall under the rules of the 1993 CBA. The 2010 season is an uncapped year where 
there are no limits on salary cap spending. The 2011-2013 seasons are played under the rules of the 2011 
CBA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*shaded region indicates the uncapped 2010 season 
 
 
There is a significant rise in team Gini coefficients after the implementation of the 2011 CBA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Gini 
 
2006 
 
0.016 
 
2007 
 
 
0.012 
 
2008 
 
 
0.016 
 
2009 
 
0.020 
 
2010 
 
0.081 
 
2011 
 
0.042 
 
2012 
 
0.030 
 
2013 
 
0.029 
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Figure 1 
 
Comparison of Mean Gini Coefficients by Team Adhering to Different CBAs 
 
 
 
         
*2010 season omitted due to lack of salary cap 
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Table 9 
 
T-Test Comparing Team Gini Means under the 1993 CBA and 2011 CBA 
 
 
Two-Sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev   95%  CI 
1993 CBA 4 .0160651 .0016832 .0033663 .0107086 .0214217 
2011 CBA 3 .0338683 .0040098 .0069452 .0166155 .0511211 
Combined 7 .0236951 .0040054 .0105973 .0138942 .0334959 
Diff  -.0178031 .0043487  -.0325168 -.0030895 
 
diff = mean (1993 CBA) – mean (2011 CBA) t = -4.0939 
Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 2.71078 
 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff! = 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.0160 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0319 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.9840 
 
 
 
There is a significant difference between team Gini means for the 1993 and 2011 CBAs. This is illustrated 
by the p-value of 0.0319 in the difference of means test above.  
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Table 10 
 
Inter-Team Gini Coefficients by Position 
 
The 2006-2009 seasons fall under the rules of the 1993 CBA. The 2010 season is an uncapped year where 
there are no limits on salary cap spending. The 2011-2013 seasons are played under the rules of the 2011 
CBA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*shaded region indicates the uncapped 2010 season 
 
There is a significant increase in all positional Gini coefficients after the implementation of the 2011 CBA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Year 
 
Gini QB 
 
Gini DL 
 
Gini OL 
 
2006 
 
0.205 
 
0.171 
 
0.127 
 
2007 
 
0.213 
 
0.160 
 
0.114 
 
2008 
 
0.217 
 
0.142 
 
0.122 
 
2009 
 
0.190 
 
0.134 
 
0.123 
 
2010 
 
0.235 
 
0.174 
 
0.171 
 
2011 
 
0.297 
 
0.196 
 
0.189 
 
2012 
 
0.236 
 
0.195 
 
0.179 
 
2013 
 
0.248 
 
0.217 
 
0.122 
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Figure 2  
 
Comparison of Mean Gini Coefficients by Position Adhering to Different CBAs 
 
 
 
 
 
*2010 season omitted due to lack of salary cap 
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Table 11 
 
T-Test Comparing QB Gini Means under the 1993 CBA and 2011 CBA 
 
 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev   95%  CI 
1993 CBA 4 .2063357 .0060406 .0120812 .1871118 .2255596 
2011 CBA 3 .2604671 .0185571 .0321419 .1806222 .340312 
Combined 7 .2295348 .0133873 .0354196 .1967772 .2622925 
Diff  -.0541314 .0170921  -.0980681 -.0101946 
 
diff = mean (1993 CBA) – mean (2011 CBA) t = -3.1670 
Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 5 
 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff! = 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.0124 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0249 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.9876 
 
 
 
There is a significant difference between the quarterback Gini means for the 1993 and 2011 CBAs. This is 
illustrated by the p-value of 0.0249 in the difference of means test above. 
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Table 12 
 
T-Test Comparing Defensive Linemen Gini Means under the 1993 CBA and 2011 CBA. 
 
 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev   95%  CI 
1993 CBA 4 .1519129 .0083315 .016663 .1253984 .1784275 
2011 CBA 3 .2022582 .0071355 .0123591 .1715565 .2329599 
Combined 7 .1734895 .0114263 .0302312 .1455302 .2014487 
Diff  -.0503453 .0115248  -.0799707 -.0207199 
 
diff = mean (1993 CBA) – mean (2011 CBA) t = -4.3684 
Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 5 
 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff! = 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.0036 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0072 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.9964 
 
 
 
There is a significant difference between the defensive line Gini means for the 1993 and 2011 CBAs. This 
is illustrated by the p-value of 0.0072 in the difference of means test above. 
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Table 13 
 
T-Test Comparing Offensive Linemen Gini Means for 1993 CBA and 2011 CBA 
 
 
Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Error Std. Dev   95%  CI 
1993 CBA 4 .1215867 .0028643 .0057285 .1124713 .1307021 
2011 CBA 3 .1633489 .0208761 .0361585 .0735262 .2531715 
Combined 7 .1394848 .0116529 .0308306 .1109712 .1679984 
Diff  -.0417622 .017792  -.0874979 .0039735 
 
diff = mean (1993 CBA) – mean (2011 CBA) t = -2.3473 
Ho: diff = 0 Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 5 
 
Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff! = 0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.0329 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0658 Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.9671 
 
 
 
There is a significant difference between the offensive line Gini means for the 1993 and 2011 CBAs. This 
is illustrated by the p-value of 0.0658 in the difference of means test above. 
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Endnotes 
1 There are a few exceptions where teams can go above the salary cap limit. An example of this includes a 
team’s salary cap carry over where they are allowed to carry over unused salary cap space into future years.  
2 Players in the 25th quantile are comprised of the players in the income distribution quantile from .2-.3. 
Players in the 75th quantile are comprised of players in the income distribution quantile from .6-.8.  
3 Gini coefficients are calculated by finding the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect 
equality and dividing it by 0.5.  
4 The NFL draft consists of seven rounds and the order of each round is determined in reverse order of its 
record the previous year. Therefore, the last place team in the NFL picks first and so on.  
5  As noted by the Business Insider list of the highest-paid players in the NFL 
6 There are currently 15 teams starting three defensive linemen while the other 17 teams start four.  
7 The big bath is a financial statement manipulation strategy where upper management concludes they will 
not meet earning targets so they manipulate the financials to take as big of a loss as possible. The rationale 
behind this is to artificially increase earnings in future years to paint management in a better light.  
8 For example, the Dallas Cowboys signed Miles Austin to a contract with a $17 million base salary in the 
year 2010. 
9 The top-five picks of the 2010 NFL draft all received contracts north of $60 million with every contract 
containing at least $30 million of guaranteed money. Sam Bradford, the first pick of the 2010 draft, became 
the second-highest player in the NFL in 2011 before ever taking at the NFL level. 
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